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Deborah Tripley, solicitor for Greenpeace, discusses the concerns of 
the environment movement over the WTO's approach to trade 
issues involving multilateral environmental agreements, highlighted 
in the Greenpeace report to the Seattle Conference.
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n recent months the WTO and its institutions have come 
under intense public scrutiny. According to one 
.commentator (Larry Elliott, The Guardian, 1 February 
2000) so intense has interest been in the WTO that it appears 
to have transformed a little heard of and rather grey institution 
into a sexy issue.
Much of the criticism of the WTO has come from the 
environmental movement concerned about the approach 
adopted by the WTO to trade issues involving multilateral 
environmental agreements.
By December 1999, criticism of the WTO had reached such 
a pitch that a number of non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), including Greenpeace (an international environmental 
organisation), attended the WTO conference in Seattle to voice 
their concerns. Some of those who attended Seattle went with 
the clear aim of 'shutting down' the WTO. However, this was 
not the purpose of Greenpeace.
The Greenpeace approach to Seattle, according to Remi 
Parmentier, Head of Greenpeace International Political Unit, 
was to ensure that:
'the WTO could and should become a tool to promote sustainable 
development and environmental protection through trade policy'.
(Speech entitled 'Sustainability, Trade and Investment   Which 
Way Now for the WTO?' delivered to Chatham House 
Conference (Environment Series), London, 27 28 March, 
2000). Greenpeace issued its Safe Trade Report at the 
conference. This contained key recommendations as to initial 
steps to be taken by the WTO in order actively to promote 
sustainable development.
In this article the author examines the difficulties in 
translating the concept of 'safe trade' into legal principles 
capable of enforcement in international law. The article 
considers whether the concept of 'safe trade' is dependent upon 
the creation of procedural environmental rights or whether 
existing principles, such as sustainability and the precautionary 
principle could help deliver 'safe trade'. Finally, the author
considers whether the term 'safe trade' would require 
international negotiations involving developing nations to 
include real provision for equity and fairness when decisions are 
taken about trade and the environment.
THE GREENPEACE REPORT
As well as taking its report on 'Safe Trade' to the Seattle 
Conference, Greenpeace distributed condoms to all the 
delegates in boxes containing the words: 'Practice Safe Trade   
Safe Trade can prevent various global infectious problems such 
as poverty, deforestation, desertification, etc. ...'. Most 
delegates got the joke! The device highlighted one of the key 
issues raised in the report and considered to be at the heart of 
the debate on the nature of 'safe trade': the issue of whether or 
not trade liberalisation, as pursued by the WTO, is inevitably at 
the expense of the environment.
There are those who argue that there is nothing inevitable 
about trade liberalisation leading to a degradation of the 
environment. For instance, the UK Government's Minister for 
Trade believes that 'international trade and environmental 
objectives can go hand in hand'. However, the environmental 
community, together with other leading NGOs, is unlikely to 
accept this statement without some guarantee that 
environmental issues can and will be taken fully into account in 
any decision-making process relating to trade.
For instance, Oxfam argues that trade liberalisation might 
reduce poverty and deliver sustainable development, but only if 
the conditions are right. In their submission to the Seattle 
Conference they argued that in order for the conditions to be 
right there would need to be fundamental reform of the WTO 
itself. Such reforms are needed to provide a 'level playing field' 
between developed and developing nations.
However, there is scant evidence to suggest that the WTO 
shares this view and accepts the need for reform. For instance, 
both the UK's Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and 
WTO strike up the position that the WTO has no role to play in 
setting policy on the environment or labour rights. This seems a
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somewhat blinkered vision. For instance, when considering the 
type of reforms the WTO could embrace, why not invite UNEP 
to participate in the WTO dispute panel whenever 
environmental issues addressed in a UNEP agreement are under 
consideration? This might go some way at least to achieving the 
'level playing field'.
Most environmentalists agree that the international
o
institutions dealing with multilateral environmental agreements, 
such as the Climate Change Convention or the Biodiversity 
Convention, are fragmented, poorly funded and badly integrated 
with one another. As expressed by Professor Philippe Sands, for 
example, this leads to a lack of any real international 
enforcement or progress in dealing with environmental 
problems (see 'Safe Trade in the 2 f st Century   A Greenpeace 
Briefing Kit' prepared by the Center for International 
Environmental Law and Greenpeace International / 
'International Environmental Law Ten Years On,' Philippe 
Sands, RECIEL Volume 8, Issue 3, 1999).
In contrast, the WTO consists of a single institutional 
framework encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and all other agreements and legal instruments 
negotiated by the Uruguay Round in 1994. Membership of the 
WTO automatically entails accepting all the results of the 
Uruguay Round. In addition, the WTO has a compulsory and 
rule-based Dispute Settlement Procedure with powerful 
compliance mechanisms, including the enforcement of 
compensation and trade sanctions.
There is simply no environmental institution that has 
comparable power. It is hardly surprising that environmental 
organisations become alarmed when the WTO settles trade
O
disputes with seemingly little understanding or consideration of 
environmental issues.
These types of criticisms were levelled by the environmental 
movement at the decision taken by the WTO in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case, in which the US had banned the import of 
shrimp that had been caught in a manner adverse to seven 
species of sea turtle that were specifically protected under 
various international environmental instruments due to their 
threatened and endangered status. The US had banned imports 
of shrimp harvested without the use of turtle excluder devices 
(TEDS). It considered this the most environmentally-safe 
option for the harvesting of shrimp. Four countries (Thailand, 
Pakistan, Malaysia and India) charged the US with trade 
protectionism and won their case before the Appellate Body of 
the Dispute Settlement Panel.
As a result of this decision, many environmentalists charged 
the WTO with undermining multilateral environmentalO
agreements agreed as a result of a democratic process. They 
claimed that the WTO was making decisions that were subject 
to little if any democratic accountability. In addition, the 
Appellate Body was criticised for taking decisions that had a 
direct impact on multilateral environmental agreements without 
taking into account environmental principles, such as that of 
sustainable development and the precautionary principle, nor 
did it take account of any expert scientific evidence on the 
environment.
In order for a level playing field to come into existence, 
environmentalists argue that multilateral environmental
agreements cannot be subordinate to WTO rules. Greenpeace 
claims this view has been supported most recently by the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety adopted in Montreal in January 
2000. This protocol points out that: 'trade and environment 
agreements should be mutually supportive with a view to 
achieving sustainable development' and that there is no intention 
to 'subordinate this Protocol to other international agreements'.
SAFE TRADE AND PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS
The use of the term 'safe trade' by Greenpeace clearly 
advocates the establishment of a number of participatory rights 
for NGOs and citizens. For instance, 'safe trade' would allow for 
rights to information, the right to be heard and participate, and 
access to the decision-making process. These rights would 'open 
up' the WTO (rather than 'shut it down') and make it a more 
transparent and accountable institution.
Clearly, the establishment of a 'right' to participate in the 
above ways would mean a greatly enhanced role for NGOs in the 
policy-setting/decision-making process of international 
agreements and possibly other fora.
Greenpeace already has observer status at international level 
in many multilateral environmental agreements. For instance, at 
the Convention for the protection of the marine environment of 
the North East Atlantic (OSPAR), Greenpeace has very wide 
access. But such rights have been established by custom and not 
by rule of procedure. In addition, it has no voting rights nor any 
access to the decision-making process.
It is widely accepted that NGO participation at international 
environmental negotiations has the effect of enhancing the 
process   for example, by helping to identify parties' interests, 
providing research and background information, shaming 
parties into action and generally making the decision-making 
process transparent. (See Stepan Wood, 'Renegrades and 
Vigilantes in Multilateral Regimes: Lessons of the Canadian-EU 
"Turbot War"', in LE Susskind, WM Moomaw, TL Hill (eds.). 
Innovations in International Environmental Negotiation, Pon Books.) 
It is noted that the WTO deals with disputes that can impact on 
millions of lives, and in particular the economic and social 
wellbeing of individuals.
CONCERN
There is a great deal of concern from environmentalists that 
an institution that has few transparent or democratic 
procedures has the power to strike down multilateral 
environmental agreements by invoking its internal rules to 
ensure free trade.
However, in order for participation by NGOs to be given the 
status of a 'right' there would need to be some form of legal 
mechanism or legal fora to deliver such a right. The European 
Court of Human Rights has touched on some of these issues in 
recent cases. For instance, in the case of Guerra and Ors v Italy 
(1998) 26 EHRR 357, the court was asked to consider a right 
to information under art. 10 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) (as well as rights under art. 8).
Here, a chemical factory was classified as 'high risk' and in 
1976 an explosion at the factory led to 150 people being
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admitted to hospital with acute arsenic poisoning. The 
applicants argued that the failure to take any action against the 
factory had interfered with their right to privacy and quiet 
enjoyment under art. 8, ECHR. They were successful in this 
claim. However, they had also argued that they had a right to be 
provided with information concerning the safety record, inter 
alia, of the factory.
The ECJ ruled against the provision of the safety record. The 
applicants had argued that art. 10 imposed a positive obligation:
'to collect, process and disseminate information not directly accessible 
or known to the public'.
However, the ECJ found that there was no such positive 
obligation, whereas the Commission had found that there was a 
positive duty on member states to provide the public with 
information as well as a 'right' to receive such information. It 
considered such rights particularly important in the 
environmental field, given the need to act pre-emptively to deal 
with many environmental problems.
In the case of Balmer-Shafroth and Ors v Switzerland (judgment 
26 August 1997, Case Note, RECEIL, Vol. 7, Issue 1, 1998; 
(1998) 25 HRR 598) the court considered access to the 
decision-making process under rights to access to justice 
created by art. 6(1) of the EC Treaty. This case 
concerned the licensing of a nuclear waste dump. 
The applicants claimed that there was no fair 
procedure for hearing objections to the renewal of the 
licence, nor any fair mechanism for dealing with 
complaints about the granting of new licences to the 
power station. The ECJ found that whilst the 
applicants had rights under art. 6(1), they were 
inapplicable in this case because the power station did 
not expose the applicants personally to a danger that was 
serious, specific and imminent. In addition, it found that the 
outcome of any proceedings would not be 'directly decisive' of 
the right in question and therefore the applicants could not avail 
themselves of art. 6(1).
A dissenting judgment argued that in the course of 
interpreting art. 6(1) the court should have taken into account 
other substantive environmental principles, such as the 
precautionary principle. In addition, the minority view was that 
the ECJ's decision effectively required the local population to be 
contaminated with radiation before they could seek a remedy 
for breach of their fundamental human rights.
From the above decisions there appears an unwillingness by 
the ECJ to expand procedural rights in a manner that could 
include a positive duty upon a member state to provide 
environmental information or access for its citizens to the 
decision-making process on environmental issues. Without the 
expansion of rights in this direction it is difficult to see what 
assistance human rights can bring to environmentalists aiming to 
prevent environmental harm, even though remedies may be 
available to individuals once a sufficient threshold of harm has 
occurred.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE
From the above discussion it is apparent that there is little if 
any legal redress for individuals, under the existing human rights
regime, where they seek the court's assistance to stop potential 
future environmental harm. However, most environmental 
problems are best resolved where it is possible to take some 
form of pre-emptive remedial action prior to any adverse 
impact on the environment.
In the 'safe trade' report Greenpeace does not argue for 
'environmental rights' as human rights. Instead, it advocates the 
incorporation of the precautionary principle and sustainable 
development into all decision-making processes.
This approach applies equally to the decision-making process 
of the WTO. There is some precedent within the WTO for 
invoking the principle of sustainable development. In the 
Preamble to the Uruguay Round Agreement it calls for the:
'optimal use of the world's resources in accordance with the objective 
of sustainable development, seeking to both protect and preserve the 
environment'.
The principle of sustainable development and the 
precautionary principle found their expression in the Rio Earth 
Summit Agreement in 1992. Both principles often have fairly 
elastic interpretations applied to them. One of the most 
comprehensive definitions of sustainable development is that 
supplied by Kiss. He says that:
on the i ri T <
http://www.psrast.org
PSRAST (Physicians and Scientists for Reponsible ApplicaHMBMfe-ice and
^j^^^ttS^B^^
Technology) is an independent scientific organisation which assesses the safety of 
new technologies. Their website has regularly updated information, articles and 
open letters to governments on such topics as GE foods.
"... 50 Jar as the actual content of the right is concerned, it is 
submitted that it includes the realisation of economic, social and 
cultural rights and the conservation oj the conditions, including 
conservation of biological diversity, which are necessary to ensure that 
attainment'.
(Alexandre Kiss, 'The Rights and Interests of Future 
Generations and the Precautionary Principle', in The 
precautionary principle and international law   the challenge of 
implementation, David Freestone and Ellen Hey (eds.), Kluwer 
Law, pp. 19 28). His interpretation supports the view that the 
concept of sustainable development need not be wholly centred 
on the individual human condition, i.e. not wholly 
anthropocentric, nor based in the present tense. This contrasts 
with many individual rights created under the ECHR.
The precautionary principle bites when there is scientific 
uncertainty about unknown risks that are likely to be both 
serious and irreversible. It is likely to require a shift in the 
burden of proof for its proper application. For instance, the 
burden of proving that a trade is safe would be on the objector 
to any trade restriction/limitation. The objector would need to 
show that the trade, process or product was 'safe' in terms of 
environmental quality, consumer protection, worker safety, and 
public health.
Greenpeace take the view that, if it were possible to invoke 
these principles in a formal way within the procedures of the 
WTO, it would become necessary to give priority to the 
environment in any decision-making process. In other words,
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like fundamental human rights claims, environmentalists hope 
to imbue such terms with similar priority when it comes to 
decision-making processes. (For a fuller discussion, see Paula M. 
Pevato, 'A right to Environment in International law: Current 
Status and Future Outlook', RECIEL, Vol. 8, Issue 3, 1999.)
Certain academics argue that just as a ' right to a clean and 
healthy environment' is fraught with difficulties of definition, so 
too are these concepts. It is said they will never amount to a 
customary international norm, but will remain part of soft law 
forever (David Freestone/Ellen Hey, op.cit).
It is true that despite numerous international agreements 
referring to these environmental principles they do not appear 
to have made their way into law as legal norms. They cannot be 
evoked as having the same type of priority of claim as 
fundamental human rights claims.
However, it is argued that if these principles were given 
greater legal status, affording them a priority ot claim, the 
balance in favour of the environment in decision-making 
processes would become more even. For example, in the case of 
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) environmentalists argue 
the precautionary principle has not been properly evoked. They 
hold that had a precautionary approach been formally 
incorporated into the decision-making process for the grant of 
consents to release and market GMOs there would have been 
few, if any, authorisations granted for their introduction into the 
human diet and the environment.
In this context decision makers have preferred to rely on a 
principle called 'substantial equivalence'. This implies that two 
foods are equivalent in all characteristics that are of importance 
to the consumer   safety, nutrition, flavour, and texture. But it 
is argued that:
' ... in actual practice the investigator compares only selected 
characteristics of the genetically engineeredJbod to those of its non- 
genetically engineered counterpart. If that relatively restricted set of 
characteristics is not found to be significantly different in these two, the 
genetically engineered food is classified as substantially equivalent to the 
corresponding non-genetically engineered food and is required to be 
neither tested further nor labelled as genetically engineered.' (John 
Pagan, PhD, The Failings of the Principle of Substantial Equivalence 
in Regulating Transgenic Foods, an article reproduced at 
www.psrast.org)
There have been some recent advances in 
ensuring greater standing for these principles. 
For instance, in the recently agreed Cartegena 
Protocol on Biosafety the precautionary 
principle is included both in the Preamble to 
the Protocol and also in the decision-making 
procedures regulating trade in GMOs. The 
Protocol states:
'Lack of scientific certainty due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information and knowledge 
regarding the extent of the potential adverse effects of 
a living modified organism on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity in the Party of 
import, taking also into account risks to human 
health, shall not prevent that Party from taking a 
decision, as appropriate, \rith regard to the import of 
that living modified organism intended for direct use
as food or feed, or for processing in order to avoid or minimise such 
potential adverse effects'. (Article 11.8, Cartagena Protocol)
Also, a recent Communication from the EC (COM (2000) 2 
Feb. 2000) setting down guidelines for the use of the 
precautionary'principle states, inter alia, that:
'The Commission considers that the Community, like other WTO 
members, has the right to establish the level of protection   particularly 
of the environment, human, animal and plant health   that it deems 
appropriate. Applying the precautionary principle is a key tenet of its 
policy, and the choices it makes to this end will continue to affect the 
views it defends internationally, on how this principle should be 
applied.'
THE CONCEPTS OF 'SAFE TRADE' AND 
EQUITY
The concept of 'safe trade' also raises the issue of fairness or 
equity for developing nations. As far as developing nations are 
concerned, the concept of fairness is likely to include, at the 
least, their equitable involvement in international negotiations 
and a fair approach adopted by developed nations when 
requiring the application of environmental protection measures 
to trade.
Many developing countries have long argued that high 
standards of environmental protection are just another form of 
protectionism. They point out that at the Rio Earth Summit in 
1992 they struck a bargain with the developed nations. This 
bargain was to allow developing countries to be compensated for 
the implementation of higher cost environmental protection 
measures by the transfer of technology and mitigation costs. 
However, this has largely not materialised.
Current negotiations aimed at implementing the Kyoto 
Protocol to the Climate Change Convention   arguably one of 
the most significant environmental conventions ratified in 
recent years   seem to underscore this point. 
As UNEP states (see the UNEP website at 
www.unfccc.de/resource/beginner.html):
'If current predictions prove correct, the climatic changes over the 
coming century will be larger than any since the dawn of human 
civilisation. Upon current scientific estimates it is almost certain that 
atmospheric levels of carbon dioxide will double from pre-industrial
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levels during the 21st century and triple by 2100 if no steps are taken 
to curb greenhouse gases.'
The Kyoto Protocol sets quantified emission targets for the 
developed countries to meet. Market mechanisms are to be injected 
into the process. These are intended to allow the parties to trade 
in various flexible trading mechanisms dealing with emissions. It 
has been suggested that future agreements should allow those 
states that are party to the protocol to bank assigned amounts 
surplus to their compliance with emissions targets. In view of 
the trading advantages such mechanisms might provide it is clear 
that these matters raise fundamental equity issues as to what 
future emission levels each country should face.
There are 165 states party to the Climate Change Convention 
  although only 100 have ratified (excluding the US). The great 
fear for developing countries is that as they expand and their 
economies grow there may not be enough natural resources to 
go round. This is likely to include climate emissions. According 
to one commentator (Farhana Yamin, 'Equity, Entitlements and 
Property Flights under the Kyoto Protocol: the Shape of Things 
to Come', RECIEL, Vol. 8, Issue 3, 1999) developing countries 
fear that:
PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS
The use of the term 'safe trade' by Greenpeace clearly 
advocates the establishment of a number of participatory 
rights for NGOs and citizens. For instance, 'safe trade' would 
allow for rights to information, the right to be heard ando ' o
participate, and access to the decision-making process.
'... when the time comes for them to assume commitments, the global 
pie of emissions will either have been 'eaten' by the Annex I Ponies 
(i.e. developed countries) to the Kyoto Protocol or else be hoarded and 
only available to developing countries at extortionate prices'.
This paints a rather bleak outlook for developing nations 
under the grand scheme of trade liberalisation. Without 
recourse to any real principles of law to curb the behaviour of 
the developed world towards trade in dwindling natural 
resources, and without any legal mechanisms to ensure a level 
playing field, there seems little chance that trade liberalisation 
will produce the pot of gold held out by the developed nations 
as the prize for free trade.
environmental instruments or environmental concerns 
generally.
However, in order for the WTO to 'open up' so that the 
environmental community can fully participate in its institutions 
there is a need for the development of procedural rights. It is 
argued in this article that such rights are unlikely to be delivered 
by reliance on existing human rights instruments. Instead, 
consideration needs to be given to the formal incorporation of 
the precautionary principle and sustainable development into 
the decision- making procedures of the WTO. This would 
ensure that decisions taken that are likely to have an adverse 
impact on the environment must first have regard, as a matter 
of priority, to these principles.
This would require, at the very least:
  the consideration of environmental information and opinions 
gathered from relevant stakeholders;
  a scientific evaluation of the adverse impacts and scientific 
uncertainties involved if the trade measure is allowed; and
  a change in the burden of proof as to whether or not a trade 
or product is safe for human health and the environment.
Finally, where the scientific uncertainties are great, and there 
is likely to be serious and irreversible harm, these principles 
require decision makers to take the step of refusing trade in 
certain goods and products.
In addition to the development of procedural rights there 
needs to be a consideration by developed nations of the need to 
invoke principles of equity or fairness when negotiating with 
developing countries. Such principles could be of critical 
importance to these countries during negotiations of both 
multilateral environmental agreements and trade agreements 
and enable a fair balance to be struck between developing and 
developed nations. On this basis, it is considered that it may be 
possible to achieve, or come close to, a level playing field which 
could ensure that the developing world can afford to implement 
environmental protection measures whilst participating in the 
grand trade liberalisation scheme.
Without such fundamental principles incorporated 
procedurally into existing WTO processes the prospect of the 
WTO being able to meet its critics adequately remains slight. ©
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CONCLUSIONS
The future challenge for the WTO is whether it can reform 
its procedures sufficiently to diffuse the criticisms it faces from 
the environmental community.
In order to deliver 'safe trade' as demanded by organisations 
like Greenpeace it will be necessary for the WTO to strike the 
right balance between trade liberalisation and the need to 
protect the environment. To date, its record is considered poor.
There is a great deal of concern from environmentalists that 
an institution that has few transparent or democratic procedures 
has the power to strike down multilateral environmental 
agreements by invoking its internal rules to ensure free trade. At 
a most basic level it is believed the WTO could reform itself by 
inviting UNEP to become involved in those trade issues
o
considered potentially protectionist in nature due to existing
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